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Evolutionary Theories and 
the Simple Simon Syndrome 
by 
Sr. Renee Mirkes, OSF, Ph.D. 
The author is director of the Center for NaPro Ethics, a division of the Pope Paul 
VI Institute, Omaha, NE. 
On October 22, 1996, John Paul II addressed the Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences on the origin of life and evolution. He argued that the results of fifty 
years of investigative studies in various branches of science have moved the 
Church's receptivity to the theory of evolution beyond its tentative response in 
Humani Generis (1950).1 The fact that a half century of scientific research 
independently conducted in varying fields has unanimously corroborated the 
theory is, in the Pope's opinion, "a significant argument'" in its favor. 
John Paul also issued an important proviso that, unfortunately, was not 
included in much of the media coverage of his statement. He insisted that, 
although the assemble.d research "leads to the recognition of more than a 
hypothesis in the theory of evolution,"2 not every interpretation of the theory is 
compatible with the truth of Divine Revelation about the identity of the human 
person. The methodology that is employed to articulate the evolutionary theory 
cannot "totally prescind from Revelation with regard to the question it raises."3 
In fact, since many of the current methodologies behind evolutionary science 
neglect the question of the 'non-material origin ofthe soul, the Pope argues that it 
is legitimate to speak of theories of evolution. Three examples are mentioned: a 
reductionist, a materialist and a spiritualist theory.4 Of the three, only the latter is 
compatible with revealed truth. 
Toward the end of evaluating these various theories of evolution in a faith 
context, this essay will, first, define the Simple Simon Syndrome, second, outline 
salient features of the Pope's conception of a spiritualist theory of evolution, and, 
third, evaluate the soundness of a theory of evolution based on a reductionist 
philosophy. 
I. The Simple Simon Syndrome? 
You remember Simple Simon. His follies were recounted in one of those 
childhood nursery rhymes we recited as children. He was the fellow that never 
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seemed to employ a proper means to his intended goals. He wanted to buy some 
pies but lacked the money to do so. He wanted to feast on wild duck but wasn't a 
skillful enough marksman to shoot the bird either before or after it took flight. But 
perhaps his silliest faux pas was when "he went fishin' for to catch a whale, and 
all the water he had got was in his mother's pail." British physiologist Sir Francis 
Walshe was probably the first to diagnose the Simple Simon Syndrome in 
reference to the reductionist philosophy that drives much of the methodology, 
interpretations, and applications of contemporary evolutionary theory. 
We all know the nursery tale of Simple Simon who went fishing for whales in his 
mother's pail. I am happy not to find myself in the ranks of those scientific Simple 
Simons who believe that with better hooks, lines, baits, pitched into the same pail, they • 
will fish out from it the answer to the riddle of the soul and the mind. The whale isn't in 
the pail! 
We live in at least two worlds, the world of the humanities and the world of science. 
The former cannot be reduced to the latter.5 
Walshe's insights echo those of Pius XII's teaching in Humani Generis and John 
Paul II's advice in his Oct. 22nd address. All of these judgments provide a sound 
criterion to help us assess the legitimacy ofthe reductionist and materialist-driven 
theories of evolution which abound today. For our purposes, the standard used to 
scrutinize a reductionist theory Df evolution will be integrated under the one rule, 
'Evolutionary theories ought to avoid the Simple Simon Syndrome.' 
II. A Spiritualist Theory of Evolution: Compatible with Revealed Faith 
Isn't a spiritualist theory of evolution an oxymoron? John Paul II doesn't 
necessarily think so. He argues that contradictions that arise prima facie may 
prove, ~fter closer scrutiny, to be only apparent conflicts.6 Ultimately, a 
spiritualist view of evolution must demonstrate that the physical continuity 
which is typically the focus of evolutionary research need not be in opposition to 
the ontological discontinuity associated with the first appearance of the human 
person. If empirical scientists are true to the strengths and limitations of their 
particular areas of expertise, they will realize that, while the "moment of 
transition to the spiritual" cannot be empirically proven, science can "discover at 
the experimental level a series of very valuable signs indicating what is specific to 
the human being" (emphasis mine).7 At that point, those involved in 
experimental sciences must entrust their research to the discipline of philosophy 
which is competent to explain what the ontological leap means in terms of 
spiritual behavior. Philosophy can interpret the meaning of man's natural 
capacities and activities that include metaphysical knowledge, self-awareness, 
self-reflection, moral conscience, freedom, and aesthetic and religious 
experience. 
But the interdisciplinary nature of an adequate evolutionary science doesn't 
stop there. Scientists and philosophers must then submit their findings to 
theologians whose expertise it is to demonstrate the ultimate meaning of the 
unique capacities of the human being. The proper provenance of theology is to 
reflect on the meaning of the embodied spirit of the human being as it is made in 
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God's image, divinized by Christ's salvific acts, and destined for eternal life in 
God. For this reason, the Pope insists that the Church's openness to an 
evolutionary theory turns on, first, whether the hypothesis recognizes what 
Scripture tells us about the temporal and eternal destiny of the body-soul totality 
of the human being. Second, ecclesial receptivity depends on efforts to reconcile 
this revealed truth with scientific data.8 
It follows, therefore, that the litmus test for the adequacy of various 
philosophies that drive the methodologies used to argue evolution is that they 
must exhibit a weltanshauung that is compatible with revelaed truth about the 
human person. A critical point is this. A theory of evolution that is in harmony 
with Christian Revelation must acknowledge that the mind or non-material 
nature of the human being cannot emerge from "the forces of living matter" nor 
come to be as "mere epiphenomenon of living matter."9 John Paul ratifies the 
point made by Pius XlI in Human Generis. While the evolution of preexistent 
matter may explain the origin of the human body, it cannot account for the 
presence of the human soul and its spiritual powers, nor can it ground human 
dignity. Since spiritual powers and functions always presuppose a spiritual 
source, the spiritual powers of man's intellect and will could not have evolved 
from non-human or brute animals. Matter is the antithesis of spirit in the sense 
that there is no potency in matter for the spiritual. The Pope implies, therefore, 
that a scientist who is a proponent of an evolutionary theory compatible with 
revealed faith will admit that there are things about the human species that he is 
unable to prove empirically. When reflecting on the first primates who appeared 
in the evolutionary timelinc-and who were capable of intellectual activities 
peculair to the human species, the scientist needs to be open to the reality that the 
capacity for those activities originates only indirectly in the material body 
disposed to that kind of activity through an evolutionary process. Specific human 
behavior follows .most directly from the spiritual principle or form of that body, 
an intellectual soul immediately created by God. Since there is no potency in 
matter for the spiritual, a being could not carry out intellectual pursuits, be 
creative, or freely make choices without an intellectual soul-even if his body 
had developed to a proportionately complex stage. 
ID. A Reductionist Theory of Evolution 
By reducing higher beings and their functions to lower beings and their 
functions, a reductionist theory of evolution is an attempt to demonstrate how 
one type of organism evolved into or became another organism. In this view, the 
essential differences between living and nonliving beings and between the various 
species ofliving beings are quantitative not qualitative, accidental not essential. In 
the case under scrutiny, the substantial differences between humans and animals 
can be explained in terms of differences in degree, not kind. Essential differences 
between species are not substantial changes but accidental ones. Take any human 
capacity or function whether physiological or physical and, according to a 
reductionist perspective, the only difference in the way that it is present in animals 
as opposed to humans is that human beings possess more of the given quality or 
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function, animals less of it. Accordingly, a human being's intellectual learning 
represents a higher expression of an animal's conditioned reflex activities. And an 
animal's conditioned reflex activities are a higher manifestation of a plant's 
stimulus-response pattern or tropism. The dissimilarities of capacities and 
functions of different species are accidental ones based as they are on more or less 
(quantity). Consequently, all lines of demarcation on the continuum of living 
species are blurred. As Carl Sagan illustrates in his statement that there are "no 
important differences between apes and man,"10 a reductionist evolutionary 
science minimalizes or denies species or categorizations according to essential 
differences. 
A contemporary reductionist theory of evolution has its most immediate roots 
in 19th century thought. Carl Sagan's remark is merely a take-off of a century's 
old idea expressed by Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895): "No absolute structural 
line of demarcation ... can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves; 
and I may add ... that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally 
futile,and that even the highest faculties of feeling and intellect begin to germinate 
in lower forms of life." II In this perspective, all living beings are reduced to the 
same cellular or chemical substrate. The same kind of reasoning is what 
prompted 1937 Nobel Prize winner Albert Szent-Gryoraji to argue that because 
of "the great, fundamental unity of living nature," there is "no real difference 
between cabbages and kings, we are all recent leaves on the old tree of life."12 
An article entitled "What Does It Mean To Be One of Us?" in the November, 
1996, issue of the Life magazine combines a commentary by Kenneth Miller with 
the intriguing photographs of Lennart Nilsson.I3 The Nilsson photos, "an 
interspecies family album," provide a comparative study of the exqusite 
choreography of parental development amongst human and non-human 
preborns. My critique will focus on Miller's narrative because in it he constructs 
the philosophical-scientific window through which he invites the reader to view 
the photos. 
In his verbal assessment of Nilsson's photos, Miller talks very much like a 
reductionist. He argues that, in attempts to uncover "our identity as Homo 
sapiens,"14 rather than concentrating on differences between man and lower 
species, we ought first to understand how humans are like other animals. Only 
when we see our resemblances to other species will the differences between us 
become obvious. 
Miller rightly contends that Nilsson's photographs make believers out of 
laymen faster than would any pedantic biological lecture on the drama of 
evolutionary science. These pictures are worth much more than a thousand 
words. They demonstrate almost at a glance the kinship which humans and 
nonhumans share. The photos confirm that, from a comparative anatomy view, 
we're all one bjg family. Then Miller explains that the similarities ofthe prenatal 
developmental schema amongst various species of vertebrates points to their 
shared ancestry. Whether it's the prenatal development of a pig, chick, monkey 
or human being, Nilsson's photos help us to see how "nature is retracing an 
eons-old learning curve"15 in the successive stages of their embryonic and fetal 
development. All stages of vertebrate prenatal development from the multicelled 
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sphere, the tubular body, the segmented body with notochord, etc., mirrors the 
genetic-directed choreography of the evolutionary process. 700 million years 
ago, the multicellar organism evolved into a tubular marine creature. Tubular 
marine animals evolved into animals with segmented bodies and a flexible spinal 
chord or notochord. 500 million years ago, animals with segmented bodies 
evolved into the first vertebrates, primitive fish. From mutant fish we got 
amphibians, amphibians begat reptiles, reptiles begat mammals. Primates arose 
from mammals and the direct ancestors of human beings arose from primates. 
Up to this point, we cannot say that there is an intrinsic incompatibility 
between Miller's account of the evolutionary history of our bodies and the 
question of the origin of the human soul. He appears to respect the limits of 
empirical science. However, when Miller returns to the subject of the uniqueness 
of the human being, the inadequacy of a reductionist view rears its head. 
"Science," he admits, "has been nibbling away at our sense of uniqueness." 
Researchers in the wild can give ample examples of very human-like behavior 
amongst subhuman beings such as monkeys and elephants. Besides learning 
some sign language, chimpanzees (who, he claims, share 99.9% of human genes) 
"invent simple tools, use herbal medicines, jockey for political advantage and 
teach etiquette to their young."16 Elephants, on the other hand, have been seen to 
"observe a moment of silence near the skeletons of fallen herdmates and carry off 
bits of bone as mementos."17 Abandoned young birds don't sing "more than a 
few faltering notes" indicating that this activity is learned from its elders rather 
than being a behavior arising solely from instinct.18 
Miller's examples from the wild raise some questions. That researchers 
actually witnessed the animal behavior just described is not incredible. But what 
is not convincing is the interpretation he places on them. Take the elephant's 
actions, for example. Is there any way of knowing empirically that the exhibited 
behavior among the herdmates is a lesser (or equal?) degree of the same kind of 
respect among humans? But that he does opt for these interpretations provides a 
clue as to Miller's hidden or not-so-hidden agenda. From these examples, he 
concludes that human beings aren't so different from other animals after all. Even 
the intellectual or spiritual activities traditionally ascribed only to humans exist at 
some startingly high degree in subhuman species. Therefore, dissimilarities 
between humans and other vertebrates are "more a matter of degree than of 
kind."19 Even in man's intellectual achievements, he advises, we ought to 
recognize our closeness to "the less accomplished animals." In other words, man 
may be much smarter than the chimpanzee, but that must be due to the small 
percentage of genetic differences between the two primates not to any essential 
difference involving an intellectual soul. Since the needs for the types of activity 
that make the human being outstanding in his functional abilities are from lower 
species, we ought to respect all life. All life is sacred, Miller, argues, because 
(quoting Nilsson approvingly) "we are all the same thing."20 
With these conclusions, Miller's commentary illustrates the principal flaws in a 
reductionist theory of evolution. First, it effaces the commonsense notion that 
living things are represented by a hierarchy of beings - plants, animals, humans 
- each of which exemplify substantial or essential differences from the rest. 
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Second, if the differences between man and the other species of vertebrates is a 
matter of more and less, positing an intellectual soul for the human species is an 
unnecessary assumption in ascertaining the meaning of life. But without at least 
the recognition of the spiritual nature of the human being, a reductionist theory of 
evolution cannot render a total view of what it means to be human; it reduces the 
human being to matter only. Third, a reductionist science obfuscates or neglects 
altogether the recognition that the origin of man's soul lies outside of the 
parameters of scientific expertise. It insists on finding the whale in the pail. In 
short, a reductionist view of evolution suffers from the Simple Simon Syndrome. 
Accordingly, behavior such as thinking and willing does not arise from the 
substantial form or human soul of the person but from a material-based 
complexity. Genes or genetic mutations specific to Homo sapiens are the sole 
source of the level of the intellectual and volitional activities traditionally 
attributed to the human being. That's why reductionists claim that chimpanzees 
. reason but just not as well as human beings. Finally, as we will discuss below, if 
practice should follow from theory, a reductionist view of evolution has the 
potential to lead to ethical practices that could only be described as barbaric. The 
difference between identifying the human being as a glorified animal rather than 
as a person is the difference between a moral order based on human dignity and a 
society lacking a moral anchor altogether. 
IV. A Critique of Reductionism: Behavior That Makes Human Beings 
Unique 
Based on the principle that the activities proper to a being follow from its 
essence, the most direct way to critique Miller's reductionist view of evolution is, 
first, to identify from a commonsense view what kind of activities appear to be 
unique to humans.21 The fallacy of a reductionist view of evolution that claims 
that human intellectual behavior is a more complex example of animal rational 
activity shows up immediately in the following capacities that are distinctly 
human. As the analysis will make clear, these activities are not a matter of a 
human ability differing from a corresponding animal by dint of degree, as Miller 
and other reductionists argue. Animals simply lack the capacities for these 
activities altogether. Second, when we inquire as to the source of such 
metaphysical activities, we must look for a proportionate wellspring. Spiritual 
activities, like the ones described below, manifest a spiritual nature. They are the 
particular functions of a human being's intellect and will which inhere in the 
spiritual principle of the soul. 
1) Only human beings engage in symbolic communication. 
Language is a sign that represents thought. But it is a construed sign not a 
natural one such as smoke or fire. Language is a symbol arbitrarily assigned 
which leads the mind to the knowledge of something else, namely, the reality 
behind the symbol. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the intellect is able to transcend the physical limits of matter by arbitrarily bestowing 
upon a thing a conventional term which in no way is necessarily related to the thing 
signified. That is, there is no intrinsic necessity that such a natural thing as a flower be 
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given the name "rose." . .. Since the human intellect, in thus transcending the conditions 
of matter, communicates in a suprasentient way, it must itself be a suprasentient or 
spiritual power (for a things acts according to its nature).22 
Communication between animals is very much confined to the concrete and 
the immediate. Therefore, although animals produce sounds, they do not 
communicate in a meaningful way. They lack an intelligence capable of 
abstraction and cannot, as a result, recognize what an arbitrarily assigned symbol 
represents. Similarly, idiomatic expressions like "It's six of one and a half dozen 
of another" would stump any creature lacking a suprasentient intellect. For the 
same reason, animals would not understand or create synonyms or homonyms, 
equivocation, riddles, or conundrums. If we took a chimpanzee for a Sunday 
drive, we could not depend on it to help us decipher the clever personalized 
license plates that are evidence of our ability to play with the language. Animals 
have left no records of inventing symbols; humans demonstrate a proliferation of 
symbols as chemistry and mathematics demonstrate. 
Perhaps the most definitive indicator of differences between animal and 
human communication is this: only human beings develop languages. Of the over 
8,000 extant languages, each requires intellectual skills on the part of the speaker 
to master its grammar. But there is no such intellectual creativity in the realm of 
animal talk. A bark of a dog is the same today as it was eons ago; a Persian cat in 
France will have the same basic meow as its American counterpart; chimps 
which have been trained to say a few words cannot master the demands of 
grammar and syntax required by every human language. 
Finally, there are those who emphasize that animals do understand things 
when people speak to them. Well that may be true, but not in the human sense of 
understanding. Human knowledge includes self-consciousness as well as 
consciousness. A rat may know that it is wet, but it does not know that it knows it. 
I know that I am wet from walking in the rain, and I know that I know it. 
2. Only human beings are scientific. 
Any quantitative differences in the ability to master science lies within the 
human species. It's not as if a chimpanzee is a better botanist than a grasshopper. 
But Einstein was definitely a better scientist than my high school physics teacher. 
As genetic engineering and the human genome project prove, the human species 
is even capable of manipulating its heredity and directing its evolution. This is all 
possible because, first, human beings have what animals lack: intellects that are 
capable of abstracting universals from particulars. All science deals with the 
universal component of things. For example, every molecule of alcohol is C H 
OH. Second, only human beings are able to grasp causality. Animals are not 
scientists or philosophers because they are not capable of grasping the intellectual 
concept of cause and effect which is essential to all scientific and philosophical 
knowledge. In short, animals are riot capable of ideas. Whitehead said it well: 
"Science and philosophy belong to men alone."23 
3. Only human beings create works of art. 
It has been said that art is the signature of man. G.K. Chesterton quipped that, 
although archeological digs have turned up pictures of reindeer drawn by 
prehistoric man, no digs will ever uncover a picture of man drawn by a 
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prehistoric reindeer! When you think about it, since much of primitive art is 
linked to symbolism, it should not come as a surprise that it is exclusive to man. 
Sir Julian Huxley opines that "One ofthe greatest mysteries of human evolution 
is the sudden outburst of art of a very high quality in the upper Paleolithic 
period."24 Furthermore, no animal species can boast of a Mozart, a 
Michelangelo, or a Shakespeare. 
4. Only human beings are religious. 
Durkheim's encyclopedic study, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 
shows that, as long as there have been humans around, they have been believers. 
Anthropologists confirm that every society exhibits a religious tendency. Again, 
it is not a matter of anthropoids being less religious than humans. There is no 
evidence that anthropoids are religious at all, nor interested in worshiping a deity 
whom they may desire to appease, praise, or thank. Degrees of religiosity exist 
only between members of the human species. William James declared that 
religion is a phenomenon exclusive to the human being, something "we meet 
nowhere else."25 
5. Only human beings make tools and complex machines. 
So as not to get embroiled in a discussion about whether an animal's use of a 
twig is tantamount to being a tool-maker, one should begin by defining a tool as 
an artificial object. And the reason why some have suggested that homo faber is 
the most definitive way to describe man is that only man both fashions tools and 
makes tools out of other tools. Further, only man using many tools constructs 
complex machines. A hammer, drill, screwdriver, snowblower, windmill, and 
spacecraft all bear human signature. No evidence exists for comparable artifacts 
designed by animals. 
6. Only human beings have a history. 
When an historian records history, he doesn't record everything that happens 
within a given block of time, but he does use a meta-historical principle in his 
process of selectivity that reflects what he believes is important or is of value. 
Such attention to the moral aspect of events indicates that writing history is a 
specifically human endeavor because it presupposes a spiritual nature capable of 
metaphysical and moral reflection. As Azar reasons, "Why is it that, of all beings, 
only man has a history; why is it that no other animal is aware of its past? 
Inasmuch as he has a body ... , man is temporal; and without time, there would 
be no history .. . Further, because man has a spiritual intellect, he can use matter 
as a means in his development, this progress constituting his history."26 Having a 
history also implies that man has a future, that he is basically a being in process 
whose development will itself become his history. Unlike inanimate things which 
are complete or finished from the start, development in humans is always 
incomplete and, therefore, capable of becoming more perfect. For theologians 
like Augustine, Whitehead, or Teilhard de Chardin, history is evidence that time 
and temporal activities are both guided by God and tending toward God. 
7. Only human beings are free persons. 
Only a human being is created for his own sake. That is why every person with 
even a minimally developed moral sense recoils from being used solely for 
someone else's pleasure or welfare. Each human being is an end in itself and 
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should never be used as a mere means to another end. As free agents, human 
beings are most themselves when in freedom they choose among goods presented 
by the intellect or choose not to choose at all. Only human beings choose a spouse 
from among many candidates and then choose to commit themselves for life to 
this other person, to love and to cherish him until death. Only human beings 
choose one profession among many and serve family and society by functioning 
in that profession. While animals are driven to copulate when in heat, only 
humans are capable of choosing whether to engage in or abstain from sexual 
relations. Only the human being is free to act morally by choosing life, loving 
God and others, forming friendships, entering into communion with others, 
working for a society based on moral values. 
While animals have certain inclinations or instinctual drives which 
automatically bring them to their fulfillment, in the human being, by contrast, 
there are no such pre-programmed guides for perfection. Man must find personal 
integration and fulfillment by choosing to act so as to regulate the basic human 
inclinations which frequently war against one another. 
Animals eat, sleep, defend themselves, and reproduce not because they choose 
to but because they are responding to instinctual drives. They act instinctually; 
they do not exercise freedom of choice and, therefore, are not held morally 
responsible for their actions. Correspondingly, if animals kill their own young, 
they are not brought to trial for murder. Human beings, on the other hand, with 
their capability of recognizing good and evil, are held accountable for what they 
choose. 
Given the rational or spiritual nature of the specific capabilities of the human 
being we have just described, we must conclude that the only proportionate 
source for self-awareness, reason, freedom, and imagination is a rational or 
spiritual soul, unique to the human species. The human being, while very much a 
part of nature, transcends the rest of nature by virtue of his definitive peculiarity. 
Only man is an embodied spirit or an inspirited body. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the most telling commentary against a reductionist view of evolution 
is that, in denying the spiritual nature of man and rejecting the spiritual faculties 
of the intellect and the will, it disavows human freedom. But in this case, if 
practice follows theory, a reductionist view of evolution has some devastating 
consequences for ethics. If the human person is not free, he is also not a moral 
being, not accountable for the good and evil he realizes in his actions. If the 
human being is unidimensional, that is, matter only, if there are no substantial 
differences between us and animals and the rest of nature, if what gives the 
human being an edge over other primates is linked to genetically-driven 
superiority producing a bigger brain and better larynxes rather than being a 
thinking, free person, what grounds the dignity of such a glorified animal? And if 
human beings do not possess a dignity specific to them arising from their spiritual 
nature, is it fair to rate present day genocide or that of Adolf Hitler as an atrocity? 
If animals can be slaughtered with impunity, why condemn the slaughter of 





humans? Why not condone cannibalism? 
If we reduce man to biology and strip him of his free will, why should we 
dedicate hospitals and clinics for the care of the sick and the aged? Why should 
we bother to be truthful in our dealing with others, why should we be respectful 
of others, their lives, goods, wives? Why should we honor and obey our parents, 
or respect our spouses or children or siblings? If man is determined and not free to 
choose, why would we even need a moral code like the 10 Commandments? 
If man is not, by nature, able to know the truth and love the good, ifhe is only a 
material being that has struck it lucky with a developmental history marked by 
chance and necessity, devoid of teleology, then why shouldn't we declare God 
dead, a human projection, a vestige of a primitive mind which was woefully 
ignorant of what evolutionary theory now teaches us about ourselves? If God is 
dead, what's to anchor a democracy founded on the notion of "one nation under 
God with liberty and justice for all?" If God is dead and the divine and natural 
law defunct, then why shouldn't we be able to justify just about every sort of evil 
deed? 
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